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471 an aristocracy. All this was to be violently changed by centralized decree from the Kremlin, a second Russian Revolution.

The outward shape of what was then conceived and carried through has often been described. The whole conception was indeed two-headed — to collectivize and mechanize agriculture, and use the displaced peasants and nomads as unskilled labour for the new industries which were being set up. The American mining engineer Littlepage,[1] who saw it all from the inside, describes well both the central conception and the manner of its execution.

> A conversation something like the following must have taken place at headquarters in Moscow. One of the big Communists said 'Well, what will we do about it? We can't put through our plans for industry unless we have a few million workers who will stay put. There will be too much of a howl if we simply make the free workers stay where they are. What can we do?' And someone would answer, 'Why not liquidate the Kulaks? We can kill two birds with one stone, get these obstinate small farmers away from the villages where they obstruct our scheme for collectivization and at the same time get plenty of industrial labor which will stay put because it is under police guard.'

THE PEASANTRY

● 474 661 He goes on to tell what he saw of the peasants being dragooned round the country under police escort and set down as forced labour to work in mines and factories. Men, women and children were driven out of their houses, and their furniture, domestic animals and all but a few clothes were taken from them, the confiscated houses being taken into use as clubs and offices. Some were herded along the camel-trails, others, packed like animals in cattle trucks, in stifling heat or bitterness of winter, were despatched by rail to centres where their labour was needed. Many died of hunger, cold or disease on the way. All seemed completely bewildered; they had lost their homes, had been forcibly removed from

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.

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lands their families had occupied for generations, and put at 474
unfamiliar work in unfamiliar surroundings. Fewer still made 661
any effort to escape, their experiences seemed to have broken up any spirit of defiance they may have had before. He explains how the numbers of peasants available made the federal police the largest single employers in Russia, and gave them a reputation for getting things done. They could always count on a steady supply of labour, that great forced-labour army which started from the days of the so-called liquidation of the Kulaks. In this way the double end was served, opposition to collective farming stifled and the sinews of industry provided.

The policy of collectivization was directed both at the settled farmers and at the nomads, but with the former was easier to achieve. In Central Asia the peasants do not usually live in scattered farms on their lands but congregate in villages huddled together for protection and defence and enjoying from ancient times some degree of communal life based on their tribal past. Each cultivator goes out daily, and sometimes nightly, from the village to his fields which are often in several parts of the village lands. One man, for instance, will cultivate his ancestral share of the best irrigated land, a similar share of land not so good, perhaps dependent on rainfall, and a share in the village common or waste where the herds pasture. The water-rights will be held in theory in common, and approportioned by ancestral shares according to traditional needs. This system was not without a collective tribal background and with sympathy and vision it might not have been impossible to have introduced reforms gradually leading to a commonalty which, taking account of tradition, should have combined the incentive of individual user with the needs of the whole village community. That, however, is what Communists would nowadays call a feudal survivalist deviation, and it is not what happened. As we have seen, the Communists aimed not at a form of collectivism which should be the most efficient consistent with its acceptability by the people, but at very greatly reducing the number of workers in the fields in order to supply industry. Redeployment in industry was

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perhaps the most important part of the plan — proletarianization as they called it.[1] They did not therefore try for a revivified tribal system, but aimed at a complete reorganization of village life, by means of a consolidation of small-holdings into large fields to be worked by a mechanized agriculture. In practice, this meant not only the dispossession of the more efficient and more prosperous farmers, but such an amalgamation of lands as to produce complete confusion of the identities of possession and user.

Essential grazing-lands came under the plough. All incentive was at least temporarily removed, and the Party slave-driver could not be everywhere at once. Thousands of cattle died of starvation or were deliberately slaughtered by the peasants in protest. The initial disasters caused even the Soviet planners to modify original plans and eventually to allow homestead holdings of a limited acreage for the individual peasant to cultivate outside the commonalty. Togan describes the position in Farghana, the richest part of Turkistan. The people were starving, and half the people landless. Draught oxen had perished in thousands. The people were exposed to every form of official tyranny and persecution — imprisonment, plunder, deportation, execution for those that stood out. Draught cattle that remained were seized and tractors brought in and shown to the farmers on condition that they should be used for cotton cultivation only and by those only who would join the *Kolkhoz*. The peasants, robbed of their horses and oxen, found their fate depending on machinery from Russia, using oil which then had also to be imported, and mechanics then also Russian. They were helpless.

Another American, John Scott,[2] has a vivid description of the methods adopted for the 'dekulakization' of a village.

'How did they decide who was to be dekulakized?' 'Ah, that's a hell of a question to ask a guy that's trying to expiate his crimes in

[1] During the second Five-Year Plan directions were issued to release 1,500,000 workers *annually* from agriculture to industry. This was for the whole Union.

[2] Bib. I, 85. A sincere admirer of the indomitable determination shown by Stalin and others in pushing through industrialization beyond the Urals, Scott also underlines the cost in blood and tears. He worked for five years at Magnitogorsk.

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honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: "So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.'

All this happened more than twenty years ago. Since then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they

[collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

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are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

[1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232-4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmets, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

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In this way the tribes of the steppe and the tribes of the mountains had roamed for centuries free-born and untrammelled, meeting only with rivalry from their own kind if they should overstep their limits. Their flocks were part of their family and they lived by and on them. For houses they had only tents (*yurts*) and wooden or adobe huts. For their Khans they had a real veneration recorded in epic poetry handed down by minstrels by word of mouth. The way of their life implied that they would be here today and gone tomorrow, and it had always been difficult for authority to control or tax them. If the seasons were kind, a tribe was self-contained and asked little of any man. In bad seasons there might be raiding and local forays. By 1929 the Soviets had not fully succeeded in driving a satisfactory wedge between the Khans and the other tribesmen on the steppe. In the settled areas it had been possible to appeal to the cupidity of the lesser men by redistributing the land of the richer; but on the steppe the redistribution of pasture lands was a most difficult operation, and that of flocks and herds almost impossible. In either case the bond between Khan and free tribesman was too close and intimate to brook official interference of that kind. It was for this reason, that, when Littlepage arrived on the steppe in 1928, he was able to record that the old life and manners of the tribes up to that time remained unchanged. Some of the old loyalties to the chief and elder, the old observances of tribal formula or prohibition, the old laws of hospitality, were still in force. At that time the tribal herds were increasing every year and the tribes supplied meat and dairy products ample for themselves and for the dwellers in cities alike. It was this system that the Soviets had to break up, if they needed these men for industry. It was a tough job.

In a pregnant passage Littlepage[1] states both points of view:

> The nomads were among the principal sufferers when the Second Communist Revolution started in 1929. But the nomads were dirty and superstitious, and I could understand how the Communist

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 185–6.

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reformers believed that they were doing them a favor by breaking up their old forms of life and persuading them, even by the use of force, to adopt a manner of life considered more civilized and sensible. On this trip, however (undertaken in 1934), as we pushed along day after day through these pastured plateaus, my sympathies went out to those nomads who had forcibly resisted their conversion into proletarians. . . . I could see how the life might appeal to them. . . . I even began to understand how they might be willing to fight for this mode of existence if someone threatened to take them away from it.

The job[1] was done not by redistribution, but by the indiscriminate rounding-up of the nomads with their animals. Nearly half those who did not die, men and women, went off to slavery. Three-quarters of the flocks and herds were slaughtered or perished uncared-for in the wilderness. When all was over, nothing remained to be seen on the steppe but once in a while a small village of Russian settlers whose ancestors had pushed into the Kazak country half a century earlier and, very occasionally, a small group of felt huts occupied by miserable-looking down-at-heel Kazaks who had been induced to settle down in cattle-breeding farms.

Lest it be thought that this picture is too highly coloured, let us turn to Soviet sources. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, a cautiously written compilation, relates[1] that, in spite of preventive measures taken by the Central Committee, most serious deviations from the Party line took place in Kazakistan, making it easier for the beys, the Kulaks and the Alash-Orda elements to carry out anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary activity. 'But', it concludes, 'with the help of the Central Committee of the Communist Party these mistakes in the set-up of the *Kolkhoz* system were put right.' We need only turn to the census returns to see how matters were put right, by measures leading to the death of one in three of the Kazak population, whether by mass starvation or by violence. That is the true picture of Soviet colonial imperialism. To allow of due completion of this process it was necessary for the

[1] *G. S. Encycl.* vol. 30, p. 598. Bib. III, 10.

[1] [i.e. collectivization -- Analyst]

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474 661 Soviets to retain Kazakistan as a part of the RSFSR (the Great Russian republic) up to 1936. It was only then, as it was openly stated, that it became possible and safe to confer on 'the Kazaks' even the circumscribed and illusory autonomy enjoyed by a non-Russian constituent republic. The delay is the more remarkable given the very large proportion of Russians in Kazakistan.

THE STOCK

233 [474] The story is not yet complete. Herdsmen cannot be killed off without loss of the animals which serve them and which they serve. In Kazakistan in 1935 there was only 1·7 head of cattle for each household grouped in a collective farm, and 6500 collective farms were altogether without a herd. The livestock losses over the whole republic in the six years 1928–1934 were estimated at 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep, and 83 per cent of the horses.[1] The real wealth of the country in men and livestock had been sacrificed on the altar of the collective deity, and there is reason to think that the losses then suffered have not been restored even today.

A study of the current Soviet press on the subject of stock-raising and stock-farming throughout Soviet Central Asia reveals an attitude and atmosphere of inspissated gloom. In Uzbekistan, for instance, it is admitted that progress has been thoroughly unsatisfactory; the required increase in the number of publicly-owned sheep and cattle has in no case been achieved, the organization of winter feeding has broken down, and what is called mass-political work among the *Kolkhoz* and *Sovkoz* workers on the collective farms has been ineffective. The same tale comes from Kirghizia and Kazakistan, and also from the Tajik Republic. To go even farther afield, it is repeated in strident tones from the Caucasus, where special complaint is made of delays in the mechanization and electrification of processes in the care of stock. Plans have not been fulfilled; veterinary services, irrigation, scientific

[1] Soviet sources quoted by M. Holdsworth, Bib. II, 9.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLI Turkestan RLI

which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *Io let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.